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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re the Marriage of: 
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and 
RICHARD L. KUNZ (deceased) 
Case No.: 20050374 CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Did the lower court err in dismissing Janice 
Kunz's petition for common law marriage on summary judgment, 
finding that Janice did not have enough evidence to support 
her claim while at the same time disallowing her the 
opportunity to engage in any discovery? Standard of Review: 
Upon review of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate « 
court will apply the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court. Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); 
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment denies 
litigants the benefit of a trial on the merits, the 
appellate court must review the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the losing party, and affirms only where it appears there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact. 
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) . Further, since summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free 
to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. Wineaar 
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Record 
Citation: This issue was raised below at, R. 12, 16-18, 63-
64, 66-68, 126-28, 154-58, and during oral argument 
(transcripts found in Record at 189-243.) 
Issue #2: Does the one-year statute of limitations 
serve as a bar to Janice's petition, where such petition was 
commenced within one year of the termination of her marriage 
to the decedent, and also within one year of the date on 
which she learned of the fraudulent marriage between the 
decedent and Lynne Kunz? Standard of review: This issue 
involves a question of law. On appeal, questions of law are 
reviewed de novo under the correction of error standard of 
review, and appellate courts will accord no particular 
deference to the lower court's conclusions. United Park 
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City Mines Co, v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 
(Utah 1993). Record Citation: R. at 155-56, 201-02. 
Issue #3: Does the mere act of obtaining a marriage 
certificate bar an interested party from attacking the 
marriage as fraudulent? Standard of review: See issue #2 
above. Record Citation: R. at 14-15, 35-36, 46, oral 
argument transcripts (R. at 189-243, passim). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following authorities are either 'determinative of 
this appeal, or are of such central importance to merit 
their inclusion herein: 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (validity of marriage not 
solemnized). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (motion practice). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (motion to dismiss). 
Utah R. Civ, P. 56 (summary judgment). 
A copy of the foregoing authorities is attached hereto 
at Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is from an Order of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Honorable Sandra N, Peuler 
presiding, dismissing on summary judgment Janice Kunz's 
petition for judicial declaration of common law marriage, 
concluding that the decedent Richard Kunz was already 
legally married to a different party, Lynne Kunz, thereby 
precluding the possibility of finding a valid marriage 
between Janice and Richard. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below: 
On April 6, 2004, Janice Kunz (hereinafter "Janice") 
filed a verified petition for judicial declaration of common 
law marriage, seeking an Order declaring her the common law 
spouse of Richard Kunz ("Richard"), who passed away on July 
9, 2003. Two parties were served with a copy of the 
petition, to wit: Lynne Kunz, an individual claiming to be 
the decedent's legal wife; and, Lillie Spencer, a purported 
"spiritual wife" of the decedent, who was never legally 
married to him. 
Before Janice was able to serve the petition on the 
4 
decedent's personal representative, Lillie Spencer filed a 
motion for summary judgment or to dismiss on April 19, 2004, 
Acting in concert with Spencer, and using the same counsel, 
Lynne Kunz filed her own motion for summary judgment, 
reasserting the same arguments raised in Spencer's motion. 
After counsel for Janice filed an affidavit seeking an 
opportunity to engage in discovery, the matter was heard at 
oral argument on September 17, 2004. The domestic court 
commissioner then issued a recommendation, concluding that 
the matter would be treated as a motion for summary judgment 
and that the motion would be granted in favor of Lillie 
Spencer and Lynne Kunz (hereinafter sometimes collectively 
referred to as the "appellees"). 
Thereafter, on September 24, 2004, Janice timely filed 
an objection to the commissioner's recommendation, coupled 
with a request for oral argument. Appellees subsequently 
filed a response to Janice's objection on October 8, 2004, 
and later submitted an affidavit in support of attorney fees 
on November 8, 2004. Janice filed a motion to strike the 
attorney fee affidavit on November 9, 2004. Shortly 
thereafter, Judge Peuler issued an Order on November 16, 
2004, upholding the commissioner's recommendation of summary 
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judgment dismissal and denying Janice's request for oral 
argument. ' 
On March 3, 2005, a hearing was held before the domestic 
court commissioner on the issue of attorney fees. Following 
the hearing, the commissioner issued a recommendation 
denying attorney fees. Appellees objected to the 
recommendation, and the matter was therefore presented to 
Judge Peuler for a decision. On March 24, 2005, Judge 
Peuler entered an Order denying the objection and upholding 
the commissioner's recommendation. Janice then commenced 
the instant appeal on April 20, 2005. No prior or related 
appeals have been taken. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
1. Janice and Richard Kunz were married in the Salt 
Lake Temple on June 18, 1953. Previously, neither party had 
ever been married. (Verified Petition, 1 4 (Record at 2)). 
2. Thereafter, the parties became followers of the 
doctrine of plural marriage, and in 1961 they divorced in 
order to allow Richard to marry another spouse, Rachel Kunz, 
in a civil ceremony. (R. at 2, 11*5-6.) 
3. Despite Janice and Richard's divorce, the two 
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continued to reside together, hold property together, and 
otherwise acted as if they were married. (R. at 2, 55 6-7.) 
4. Rachel Kunz subsequently passed away in 
approximately May of 1994. (R. at 2, 1 8.) 
5. Thereafter, Janice and Richard continued to reside 
together as common law husband and wife. (R. at 2, 1 7.) 
6. Sometime later, Richard took another spiritual 
wife, Lillie Spencer, but he did not legally marry her. (R. 
at 2, 1 9; Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 1 8 (R. at 22)). 
7. On or about September 17, 1999, -Richard purported 
to marry another individual, Lynne R. Kunz, in a secret 
civil ceremony, with a marriage license and certificate 
issued. (R. at 2, 1 10; R. at 22, 1 9; R. at 46.) 
8. At the time of his marriage to Lynne, Richard was 
already common law married to Janice. (R. at 2, 1 11.) 
9. The marriage to Lynne was done in utter secrecy, 
without Janice's knowledge. (Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 1 9 
(R. at 22); Affidavit of Viroque Kunz, 55 3-4 (R. at 46)). 
It was done as a matter of expediency and as a favor to 
Lynne, to allow her—a British citizen--to remain in the 
country on an expiring visa. (R. at 35-36, 55 10-14; R. at 
46, 51 3-4)) . Lynne was already the plural wife of a 
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different husband, Andrew Williams, but she was unable to 
legally marry him because he had already taken a legal wife. 
(Affidavit of Debbie Darger, M 11-12 (R. at 35-36); 
Affidavit of Viroque Kunz, 13-4 (R. at 46)). 
10. Following their "civil union", Lynne did not 
cohabit with Richard, nor did the couple hold themselves out 
as husband and wife, nor did they hold property together, 
nor did they have children together. (Affidavit of Debbie 
Darger, If 11-14 (R. at 35-36); Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 11 
9-10 (R. at 22)). 
11. By contrast, Janice and Richard continued to reside 
together, and held themselves out as husband and wife and 
acquired a general reputation in the community as married. 
This situation existed from June 18, 1953, through July 9, 
2003, when Richard passed away. (Verified Petition, M 12-
14 (R. at 2-3); Affidavit of Janice Kunz, II 6, 11-12 (R. at 
22-23)). 
12. Janice and Richard had two children together during 
their marriage. (Verified Petition, 1 15 (R. at 3)). 
13. Janice and Richard held property together jointly 
during their marriage. (Affidavit of Janice Kunz, If 6, 11-
12 (R. at 22-23)). 
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14. On June 18, 2003, the date of Janice and Richard's 
50th wedding anniversary, Lillie presented the couple with 
an anniversary card, congratulating them on their golden 
anniversary. The card reads in pertinent part: "Richard and 
Janice[,] God Bless You on Your Golden Anniversary." (Id., 
1 13 (R. at 23)). 
15. Richard died on July 9, 2003, at age 68. 
(Verified Petition, 5 2 (R. at 1)). Lynne attended his 
funeral, but not as his surviving widow. Instead, she 
attended the funeral with her real husband, Andrew Williams, 
along with Andrew's other wife, Teresa. The funeral log 
shows them signing in as follows: "Andrew, Lynne & Teresa 
Williams." (Attachment to Affidavit of William P. Morrison 
of 6/2/04 (R. at 71)). 
16. At the grave site, Andrew Williams made some 
remarks about Richard, stating that he had done a lot for 
Andrew's family, his wives, and himself. Andrew made these 
comments with his wife Teresa on one arm, and his other wife 
Lynne on the other. (Affidavit of Viroque Kunz, 34 (R. at 
46)) . 
17. Janice filed her verified petition for judicial 
declaration of commmon law marriage on April 6, 2004. (R. 
9 
at 1.) Service of process of the verified petition on Lynne 
was accomplished by way of service on Andrew Williams at a 
common address- (Affidavit of William P. Morrison of 
2/2/04, 1 12 (R. at 67); Constable's Affidavit of Service, 
R. at 48)). Lynne has not contested the validity of such 
service- (See Court Docket, passim.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Janice is the only party entitled to legal recognition 
of her marriage to Richard. From the date of the couple's 
legal union in the Salt Lake Temple in 1953, continuing for 
the next fifty years until the time of Richard's death in 
July of 2003, the parties resided together, held property 
together, had children together, and held themselves out and 
acquired a reputation in the community as husband and wife. 
By contrast, the secret marriage of Richard and Lynne 
was nothing other than a sham. It was a marriage of 
expediency, nothing more. At no time did these two 
individuals ever reside together, have children together, 
hold property together, file taxes together, or hold 
themselves out as husband and wife and establish a 
reputation as such in the community. Rather, their union 
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was simply undertaken to allow Lynne to remain in the 
country on an expiring visa. This so-called marital union 
was a fraud when it was undertaken, and it remains a fraud 
to this date. There is no basis in law or fact to uphold 
the marriage, nor to afford it any legal recognition. This 
Court should therefore reverse the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the appellees, and reinstate 
Janice's petition forthwith. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISPOSING OF THIS 
CASE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This is not a case that should have been decided on 
summary judgment. The issues involved in this case are 
factually unique, and are believed to be matters of first 
impression. Such issues do not lend themselves well to 
summary disposition. On summary judgment, the law must be 
well settled in favor of the moving party, and the moving 
party must show the nonexistence of any genuine issues of 
material fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In the instant case, 
the law is not well settled, and the fundamental issue in 
the case is sharply disputed, to wit: whether Lynne is the 
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surviving widow of the decedent, or whether such title 
properly belongs to Janice. In light of the foregoing, it 
was imprudent for the lower court to dispose of this case on 
summary judgment. As the following discussion will 
demonstrate, the lower court granted summary judgment in 
error, and this Court should therefore reverse the lower 
court's decision and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
A. Two Critical Errors Were Committed Below, 
Each of Which Warrants Reversal 
It is submitted that the domestic court commissioner 
made two fundamental errors in granting summary judgment 
below, which errors were perpetuated by the lower court. 
First, the commissioner improperly weighed the evidence, 
choosing to disbelieve the claim made by Janice in her 
affidavit that she did not know of Lynne's marriage to 
Richard until after Richard had passed away. Second, the 
commissioner improperly concluded that Janice lacked the 
requisite evidence to show the invalidity of Lynne's 
marriage to Richard, while at the same time denying Janice 
the opportunity to obtain additional evidence through the 
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process of discovery. Both of these errors warrant reversal 
of the lower court7s decision. 
The first error shows that the lower court did not 
properly follow the law in entering summary judgment in 
favor of the appellees. On summary judgment, it is not the 
proper role of the court to weigh the evidence. Instead, 
the role of the court is to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party- Wineaar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Canfield v. Albertsons, 
Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992). As stated by 
the United States Supreme Court: "The evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are 
to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. American Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (U.S. 1986) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the domestic court commissioner 
improperly weighed the evidence. Instead of believing 
Janice's evidence, which showed that Janice was unaware of 
the purported marriage between Richard and Lynne until after 
Richard's death (Affidavit of Janice Kunz, 1 9 (Record at 
22)), the commissioner viewed this evidence skeptically. 
This is clear from two statements made by the commissioner 
during oral argument. The first statement is reported at 
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page 216 of the Record, wherein the following remark is 
made: "Then somewhere around 1999 we get Lynn and Richard. 
Supposedly Janice doesn't know about it. It's a secret 
marriage." (R. at 216 (Addendum C, at 28:19-20) (emphasis 
added)). The commissioner's use of the word "supposedly" 
shows marked skepticism on her part as to the truthfulness 
of Janice's affidavit. 
The second indication of the commissioner's disbelief of 
Janice's evidence is found at pages 223 and 224 of the 
Record, wherein the the following exchange is reported: 
THE COURT: [Tjhere were a few facts that I 
wanted to get clear. Janice didn't know about 
the marriage to Lynn, supposedly, until the 
log—the funeral log, if I recall. They never 
knew each other? They never knew each other— 
never met? 
MR. MORRISON: I can't say for certainty 
whether that's true, but I don't— 
THE COURT: She has resided with Richard 
every day, every moment? 
MR. MORRISON: When you say "she" you mean— 
THE COURT: Janice. 
MR. MORRISON: —Janice. 
THE COURT: Every day, every moment since 
really their marriage? 
MR. MORRISON: Not totally correct because 
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hefs also split part of his time with Lillie 
Spencer, so I don't want to mislead the Court 
on that, 
THE COURT: Okay- So Lillie Spencer signed 
the marriage certificate with Lynn, and so how 
would he not—how would she not know? Did 
these—they never talk, Lillie and Janice never 
talk, and they wouldn't have mentioned this 
little certificate that has Lillie's name on it 
where he's spending half of his time? 
(Record at 223-24 (copy attached hereto at Addendum C, at 
31-32, LL 15-26, 1-12) (emphasis added)). 
Here, we clearly see the commissioner weighing the 
evidence, and effectively disregarding the allegation made 
in Janice's affidavit that she knew nothing of the Lynne and 
Richard wedding until after Richard had died. Janice cited 
this improper weighing of the evidence in her objection to 
the commissioner's recommendation, but the lower court did 
nothing to rectify the matter. Instead, the lower court 
summarily affirmed the commissioner's grant of summary 
judgment without a hearing. This was improper, and warrants 
reversal in and of itself. See Webb v. McGhie Land Title 
Co., 549 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1977) (summary judgment is a 
drastic action, not favored except in those rare instances 
where a trial on the merits would be fruitless); Brandt, v. 
Soringville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460 (Utah 1960) (stating 
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that because summary disposition denies litigants the 
benefits of a trial, courts are, and should be, reluctant to 
invoke the remedy); Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 
1982) (same). 
The second fundamental error that was made below 
concerns the lower court's refusal to allow Janice to engage 
in any discovery. This is important, because the lower 
court made a ruling that cut against Janice with a double 
edged sword. The court ruled that Janice did not have 
sufficient evidence to support her claim that Lynne's 
marriage to Richard was a fraud, while at the same time 
barring Janice from obtaining additional evidence to support 
her claim through the process of discovery. 
At oral argument, the domestic court commissioner 
hammered this matter home. She stated in her ruling: 
"Looking at all of the facts, the petitioner was married and 
then subsequently divorced from the decedent, Mr. Kunz, and 
she wants that declared now to be a common law marriage, 
which on its face I have to invalidate the certified copy of 
the marriage between Lynn and Richard in 1999. To do that 
there has to be clear and convincing evidence that that was 
fraud. I don't have—that is a higher level. It is just 
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under a criminal standard. I don't have that level. It 
doesn't rise to that level. I can't see that I shouldn't 
grant the summary judgment because on its face and the 
documents presented, the evidence presented is there is a 
valid marriage." (Record at 228 (Addendum C, at 36:11-22) 
(emphasis added)) . 
Janice timely submitted an objection to the 
commissioner's recommendation, asserting in part that 
discovery should be allowed before a ruling was entered on 
the summary judgment motion. How else could Janice hope to 
prove, by the commissioner's standard, that a fraud occurred 
by "clear and convincing evidence"? Yet the lower court 
overruled Janice's objection and upheld the commissioner's 
recommendation, concluding that further discovery was 
unnecessary. (Order of November 16, 2004, at 1 (Record at 
272)). This was clear error. 
Under Utah law, it is generally not appropriate for a 
court to rule on a pending summary judgment motion until 
after the deadline for discovery cutoff has passed, because 
information may be learned through discovery sufficient to 
defeat the motion. Such was the holding in Auerbach's, Inc. 
v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977) and Downtown 
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Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). Notably, these cases was 
decided before the adoption of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The rule of law laid down in these cases 
is even more apropos now, because Rule 26 strictly prohibits 
parties from engaging in any discovery until after the 
parties have held an attorney's planning meeting and have 
submitted a case management order, which does not occur 
until after an answer is filed, Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d). 
In this case, counsel for Janice cited to the Horman 
decision and requested that no ruling on the pending summary 
judgment motion be made until after the parties had 
conducted discovery. In addition, counsel filed an 
affidavit requesting an opportunity to engage in discovery. 
Among other things, the subject affidavit stated that 
written discovery requests were needed, as well as several 
depositions. Counsel requested an opportunity to depose 
Lillie Spencer, Lynne Kunz, and Andrew Williams. Counsel 
also stated that discovery was particularly necessary on the 
validity of the solemnized marriage between the decedent and 
Lynne Kunz. Since this marriage was done in utmost secrecy, 
not much information was available about the same, thus 
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warranting the need for discovery. Further, counsel stated 
that discovery needed to be conducted on the issue of 
Lynne's marriage to Andrew Williams. Such matter was 
relevant because of its bearing on Janice's claim that 
Lynne's marriage to Richard was a sham, inasmuch as she was 
already married to someone else. 
The domestic court commissioner refused to allow any 
discovery. Such ruling was upheld by the lower court, which 
concluded that "further discovery was unnecessary." (Order 
of 11/16/04; R. at 272.) This ruling was.entered in error. 
It was simply not appropriate for the lower court to have 
resolved this matter on summary judgment, without affording 
Janice an opportunity to engage in any discovery. Such 
result is unsound and contrary to law,. Not only is it 
contrary to the Horman case, but it is also contrary to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Where, as here, the court 
elects to treat a Rule 12(b) (6) motion as a motion for 
summary judgment, each party must as a matter of law be 
afforded an opportunity to present all material evidence to 
the court that is relevant to the motion. Rule 12 provides 
in pertinent part: "If, on a motion asserting the defense 
number (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a 
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claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b) (emphasis added). 
The lower court's entry of summary judgment in favor of 
the appellees, without affording Janice the opportunity to 
engage in discovery and present all pertinent and relevant 
evidence to the court, runs afoul of the law and must be 
overturned. This Court should therefore reverse the lower 
court's decision, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
B. Janice's Petition Was Timely Filed within 
One Year of the Date on which Her Marriage 
to Richard Was Terminated 
There is no basis for concluding that Janice's petition 
was untimely filed- Under Utah law, petitions for judicial 
declaration of common law marriage must be commenced within 
one year of the date on which the marriage relationship 
terminated. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2). In the instant 
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case, Janice's marriage to Richard was terminated by his 
death in July of 2003. Her petition was filed in April of 
2004, well within the one year limitation period. 
Therefore, her petition was timely filed. 
Appelleesf may attempt to claim that Lynne's solemnized 
marriage to Richard in September of 1999 ended Janice's 
common law marriage to him, thus rendering her petition 
untimely when it was filed in April of 2004. This argument, 
however, is unavailing, because Lynne fraudulently concealed 
her marriage to Richard. Under Utah law,•it is well settled 
that acts of fraudulent concealment toll the statute of 
limitations. Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, (Utah 
2001)• In the instant case, Janice has asserted that 
Lynne's marriage to Richard was a fraud, which was concealed 
from the public. The evidence before this Court shows that 
such marriage was undertaken in utmost secrecy, and was done 
not to effectuate a valid marriage but to try to skirt 
immigration laws and allow Lynne to remain in the country on 
an expiring visa. The evidence further shows that Janice 
knew nothing of the Lynne and Richard marriage until after 
Richard had passed away. Under Utah law, these facts are 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, at least 
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until Janice discovered the fraud or, through the exercise 
of reasonable dilligence, should have discovered it. 
Indeed, this is the law laid down by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Hill/ a case in which appellees' counsel served as an 
attorney of record. 
Based upon the foregoing, the statute of limitations on 
Janice's petition did not begin to run until she discovered 
the fraudulently concealed marriage of Lynne and Richard. 
This discovery was not made until after Richard had passed 
away, according to Janice's affidavit. Since Janice's 
petition was commenced within one year of the date of 
Richard's death, the petition was timely filed under any 
factual scenario. Hence, the statute of limitations does 
not provide a sound basis for upholding the dismissal of 
Janice's petition. This Court should therefore reinstate 
the petition and allow it to proceed on its merits. 
II. JANICE'S MARRIAGE TO RICHARD IS THE ONLY 
MARRIAGE ENTITLED TO LEGAL RECOGNITION 
Everything that appellees have done in this case has 
been geared toward prevailing on procedural grounds, not on 
the merits. Instead of submitting an answer to Janice's 
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petition, appellees have filed a motion for summary judgment 
or to dismiss. Instead of allowing some discovery to be 
taken before seeking a ruling on their motion, appellees 
have opposed Janice's request for discovery. Instead of 
submitting a detailed affidavit supporting the validity of 
Lynne's marriage to Richard, appellees have tendered a terse 
affidavit from Lynne, seeking to uphold the form of a paper 
marriage certificate over the substance of a valid marriage. 
On appeal, appellees have continued their pattern of 
advancing form over substance, procedure over merit. Once 
again, we see every effort being made to attack Janice's 
appeal on procedural grounds, not on its merits. This is 
evident by the two motions for summary disposition that 
appellees have already filed, seeking a premature resolution 
of this appeal without reaching the merits of the case. The 
only fair inference to be drawn from appellees' actions is 
that they are afraid of the merits of this case, which do 
not support their position. Indeed, the merits 
overwhelmingly favor Janice. 
For a period of over 50 years, Janice has dutifully 
stood at Richard's side as his friend, companion and spouse. 
During this time, she resided with him, held property 
23 
jointly with him, had children with him, and held herself 
out as his wife. Her union with Richard bears all of the 
stamps and indicia of a valid marital relationship. By 
contrast, what evidence has Lynne offered to show a valid 
marital relationship with Richard? Nothing more substantive 
than a scrap of paper. Consider her affidavit, and its 
woeful silence as to any indication of a valid marriage to 
Richard. Does the affidavit allege any period of courtship 
with Richard? No. Does it allege any cohabitation with 
Richard? No. Does it allege that any children were born of 
their union? No. Does it allege that the parties held any 
property jointly together? No. Does it allege the filing 
of any joint tax returns? No. Does it allege any honeymoon 
being undertaken after the parties married? No. Does it 
allege any holding out by the two as husband and wife? No. 
Does it allege the establishment of a reputation in the 
community as that of husband and wife? No. 
In its silence, the affidavit of Lynne Kunz actually 
tells the real story. It speaks of immigration fraud. It 
speaks of marriage fraud. It speaks of a fraud on the 
court. 
Unfortunately for Lynne, the law does not provide any 
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legal recognition of sham marriages- The definition of a 
sham marriage is one that is undertaken in jest for an 
unlawful purpose, with no intent by the parties to establish 
a life together. United States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490 (4th 
Cir. 1985), Such marriages have always been improper, but 
have recently come under great scrutiny and widespread 
attack as being a huge source of abuse with respect to 
immigration laws. In this arena, sham marriages are 
undertaken to allow an immigrant to enter or remain in the 
country and receive priority for permanent residency status. 
Id. Again, this is unlawful. A sham marriage is a fraud 
marriage, and the parties thereto are subject to severe 
criminal penalties. See, e.g., Lutwak v. United States, 73 
S.Ct. 481, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Yum. 776 F.2d at ; 
United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2nd Cir. 1945), 
cert, denied 326 U.S. 766 (1945); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 
1184, 1186a (1994) (Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 
1986). 
In this case, Janice has alleged that the marital union 
of Lynne and Richard was a sham. It was a sham from the 
outset, done for an unlawful purpose. It was undertaken for 
the sole and express purpose of allowing Lynne, a British 
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citizen, to remain in the country on an expiring visa. The 
marriage ceremony itself was done in utmost secrecy, and 
following the ceremony there was no cohabitation by the 
parties nor an intent to remain together as husband and 
wife. This by its very definition is marriage fraud. As 
stated by author Ilona Bray in her legal treatise, FIANCE & 
MARRIAGE VISAS: A COUPLE'S GUIDE TO U.S. IMMIGRATION (3rd ed. 2005), 
"[a] sham marriage is one that is entered into in order to 
get around the U.S. immigration laws. For a marriage to be 
valid under the law, it is not enough that the couple had a 
real marriage ceremony and got all the right governmental 
stamps on their marriage certificate. They have to intend 
to live together in a real marital relationship following 
the marriage ceremony—and prove their intention through 
their actions." (Emphasis added) (excerpted at Addendum D)). 
The marriage certificate that Lynne and Richard obtained 
may have been real, but their purported martial union was 
not. At all times material herein, Lynne was already the 
putative plural wife of Andrew Williams. She had no intent 
to marry Richard, other than to obtain a piece of paper 
allowing her to remain in the country and defraud the United 
States. Janice is the real spouse and widow of the 
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decedent, and her marriage to Richard is the only one worthy 
of legal recognition. This Court should therefore reverse 
the lower court's dismissal of her petition, and reinstate 
the same forthwith. 
CONCLUSION: 
Based upon the foregoing, Janice respectfully asks this 
Court to reverse the lower court's entry of summary judgment 
in favor of the appellees. The lower court dismissed 
Janice's petition for common law marriage' in error. This 
Court should therefore reverse the lower court's decision, 
and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2.2-** day of (%^cy^jLst 2005. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Wp [VW^^r^-
William P. Morrison 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Janice R. Kunz 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
30-1-2.1 H1LSM/VMIIAMI) WtKK 
M-1 -? 1. Validation of marriage to a person subject to 
chronic epileptic fits who had not been ster-
ilized. 
All marriages, otherwise valid and legal, contracted prior to 
the effective date of this act, to which either party was subject 
to chronic epileptic fits and who had not been sterilized, as 
provided by law, are hereby validated and legalized in all 
respects as though such marriages had been duly and legally 
contracted in the first instance i %3 
30-1-2.2. Val ida t ion of i n t e r r a c i a l m a r r i a g e s . 
All interracial marriages, otherwise valid and legal, con-
tracted prior to July 1,1965, to which one of the parties of the 
marriage was subject to disability to marry on account of 
Subsection 30-1-2(5) or (6), as those subsections existed prior 
to May 14, 1963, are hereby valid and made lawful in all 
respects as though such marriages had been duly and legally 
contracted in the first instance. 1996 
30-1-2.3. Validation of m a r r i a g e to a p e r s o n w i t h ac-
q u i r e d immune deficiency s y n d r o m e o r o the r 
sexually transmitted disease. 
Each marriage contracted prior to October 21,1993, is valid 
and legal but for the prohibition described in Laws of Utah 
1991, Chapter 117, Section 1, Subsection 30-1-2(1) regarding 
persons afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome, 
syphilis, or gonorrhea, is hereby valid and made lawful in all 
respects as though that marriage had been legally contracted 
in the first instance. 1996 
30-1 -3. Marriage in belief of death, or divorce ol former 
spouse — Issue legitimate. 
When a marriage is contracted in good faith and in the belief 
of the parties t ha t a former husband or wife, then living and 
not legally divorced, is dead or legally divorced, the issue of 
such marriage born or begotten before notice of the mistake 
shall be the legitimate issue of both parties. ' 1953 
*M I L Validity of foreign marriages — E x c e p t i o n s . 
A marriage solemnized in any other country, s ta te , or 
territory, if valid where solemnized, is valid here, unless it is 
a marriage: 
(1) tha t would be prohibited and declared void in this 
s tate , under Subsection 30-1-2(1), (3), or .(5); or 
(2) between parties who are related to each other 
within and including three degrees of cransangiiinity, 
except as provided in Subsection 30-1-1(2), 1996 
30-1-4.1. M a r r i a g e recogni t ion policy. 
(1) (a) I t is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage 
only the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in 
this chapter. 
(b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a 
m a n and a woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, 
this s tate will not recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to 
any law creating any legal s ta tus , rights, benefits, \>r 
duties tha t are substantially equivalent to those provided 
under Utah law to a man and a woman because they are 
married. 
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) impairs any contract or other 
rights, benefits, or duties that are enforceable independently 
of this section > 2004 
30-1-4.5. Val idi ty of m a r r i a g e n o t so lemnized . 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if' a court or administrative 
order establishes tha t it arises out of a contract between a 
man and a woman who: 
(a) are of legal age stnd capable of giving consent, 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized mar-
riage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited, 
(r\) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obliga-
l i l l l l , 111ll v 
u I n liii hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
1111111 H 111 Jtad general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marr iage un-
der this section mus t occur during the relationship described 
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination 
of tha t relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable 
under this section may be manifested in any form, and m a y be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in 
other cases. 2004 
30-1-5, Marriage solemnization —• Before unautho-
rized person — Validity. 
(1) A marriage solemnized before a person professing to 
have authority to perform marriages shall not be invalidated 
for lack of authority, if consummated in the belief of the 
parties or either of tjiem tfyat he had authority and tha t they 
have been lawfully married. 
(2) This section may not be construed to validate a mar-
riage tha t is prohibited or void under Section SO-1-2, 2001 
30-1-6. Who m a y s o l emn ize m a r r i a g e s — Certif icate. 
(1) Marriages may be solemnized by the following persons 
only: 
(a) ministers, rabbis, or priests of any religious denom-
ination who are: 
(i) in regular communion with any religious soci-
ety; and 
(ii) 18 years of age or older; 
(b) Native American spiritual advisors; 
(c) the governor; 
(d) mayors of municipalities or county executives; 
(e) a justice, judge, or commissioner of a court of record; 
(f) a judge of a court not of record of the state; 
(g) judges or magistrates of the United States; 
(h) the county clerk of any county in the state, if the 
clerk chooses to solemnize marriages; 
(i) the president of the Senate; 
(j) the speaker of the House of Representatives; or 
(k) a judge or magistrate who holds office in U tah when 
retired, under1 rules set by the Supreme Court. 
(2) A person authorized under Subsection (1) who solem-
nizes a marriage shall give to the couple married a certificate 
of marriage tha t shows the: 
(a) name of the county from which the license is issued; 
and 
(b) date of the license's issuance. 
(3) As used in this section: 
v
 (a) "Judge or magistrate of the United States" means: 
(i) a justice of the United States Supreme Court; 
(ii) a judge of a court of appeals; 
(iii) a judge of a district court; 
(iv) a judge of any court created by an act of 
Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold 
office during good behavior; 
(v) a judge of a bankruptcy court; 
(vi) a judge of a tax court; or 
(vii) a United States magistrate. 
(b) (i) "Native .American spiritual advisor" means a 
person who* 
(A) (I) leads, instructs, or facilitates a Native 
American religious ceremony or service; or 
(II) provides religious counseling; and 
(B) is recognized as a spiritual advisor by a 
federally recognized Native American tribe. 
(ii) "Native American spiritual advisor" includes a 
sweat lodge leader, medicine person, traditional reli-
gious practitioner, or holy man or woman. 
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- New trial. 
Provision that notice of hearing on motion be 
served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing does not apply to 
motion for new trial and such notice is not 
integral part of motion for new trial; rule does 
not change procedure whereby a motion can be 
called up at any time parties desire to do so. 
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 
275 (1960). 
—Compliance with rule. 
Actual notice. 
The trial court may dispense with technical 
compliance with the five-day notice provision oi 
Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof that 
a party had actual notice and time to prepare tc 
meet the questions raised by the motion. 
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236 
(1974); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 
R2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). 
Ineffective notice. 
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to 
give five days' notice when notice was by mail, 
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for 
mailing were (to be deducted from eight-day 
period. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah 
1975). 
Time to prepare. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day no-
tice of hearing to release property subject to 
writ of attachment where he had adequate time 
to prepare for hearing and defendant was re-
quired to post cashier's check in lieu of security. 
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 
(1974). * ' 
—Continuance. 
Surprise. 
Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for 
continuance five days before date set for hear-
ing nor failure to file afBdavits accompanying 
motion justified denial of motion where plain-' 
"iff's counsel did not learn of reason for plain-
aff's inability to appear at hearing in time to 
nake motion five days before hearing and Rule 
10(b) does not* expressly require affidavits to 
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Fohnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 R2cl 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 
Id 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 
R2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v, 
Larson, 555 P.2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen 
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978); 
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium 
Servs., [nc, 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal 
Land Dev. v. Inteimountain Stock Exch., 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); KO. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v. 
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991); 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 
90, 54 R3d 1153. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et 
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders 
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117, 
227-229. 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8; 
66 CJ.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71C. J.S. Pleading 
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 CJ.S. Process §§ 72, 78. 
AJL.R.—yafcating'judgment or granting neV 
trial in civil case* consent as ground of after 
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute 
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to 
timely prosecute action, 15 AL.R.3d 674. 
Validity of service of summons or complaint 
on Sunday or holiday, 63 AL.R.3d 423. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Com sequences of prosecution's failure to file 
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th 
213. 
Whait constitutes bringing an action to trial 
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid 
dismissal under state statute or court rule 
requiring such activity within stated time, 32 
A.L.R.4th 840. 
PART BDL PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
ings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; 
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party 
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
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(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall" be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial of in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in 
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum. Within ten days after service of thte motion and, supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to 
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other 
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a 
proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. Eeply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of 
argument without leave of the court. 
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex 
parte application and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For 
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials, 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pajges of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a ifable of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision"The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was^  
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decisioh. I 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion'. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action 
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. 
25 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order fonthe payment 
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they' are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the.court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity witli the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed' order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of 
a court commissioner is the order of the court unfed modified by the court. A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made 
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, 
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.) 
Advisory Committee Note.—The practice 
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not 
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain 
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that 
party's motion, memoranda and supporting 
documents and, if so, when and where to de-
liver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just 
orders upon motion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment deleted denominated as such" after 
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Sub-
divisions (b) and (c); and added Subdivisions (d) 
to(g). 
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in pro-
ceedings before a court commissioner" in Sub-
division (b); substituted the first paragraph in 
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths 
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivi-
sion (f)(2), substituted ^serv'e upon the other 
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added 
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substi-
tuted "recommendation" for "recommended or-
der" several times and substituted "made in 
open court" for "entered" and added the clause 
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and 
added the second paragraph of the Advisory 
Committee Note. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 7, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. —Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3. 
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, 
UR.C.R 12(g). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P. 
12(i). 
Directed ve rdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, motion for, UJR.C.P. 50. 
Dismissal of actions, U.R.CJP. 41. 
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of 
complaint in, § 78-34-6. 
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P. 
43(b). 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69Aet seq. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, 
§ 78-36-9. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. * 
/ "Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Partition of property, complaint to set forth 
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2. 
Pleading special matters, TIR.C.P. 9. 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60. 
Requirements, of signature, U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, ILR.C.P. 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
65B(a). 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 78-
2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 
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Rule 12, Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the 
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service 
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. 
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply 
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different tim$ is fixed by 
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a 
pleading doe^ s /not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days 
after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
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which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that'claim 
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Ri*Le 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial oil application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike 
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then avyailable which this rul^ permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or 
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the_ court shall order the 
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plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentahty, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file, undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to, file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
U.RC.P. 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria. 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
—Purpose. 
Delay. 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
—Explained. 
—Habeas corpus. 
—Improper. 
—Proper. 
—Standard. 
—Standard of review. 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause in contract. 
Presentation of defenses. 
—Assigned claims. 
—Fraud. 
—How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Divorce. 
Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
General and special appearances. 
Statute of frauds!: 
Venue. 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
Standard of review. 
Statute of limitations. 
Summary judgment. 
—Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Court's initiative. 
—Defenses. 
—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
—Defect of parties. 
—Defective service of process. 
—Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
—Failure to pay consideration. 
—Mutual mistake. 
• —Statute of frauds. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Waiver. 
Cited. 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
When urging the trial court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima 
facia showing that the trial court has personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in 
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Ander-
son v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 
PJ2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
900,112 S. Ct. 276,116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casi-
no's motion to dismiss a Utah patron's jpersonal 
injury suit, where the patron's complaint al-
leged sufficient facts to support general per-
sonal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of 
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters,, Inc., 2001UT 63, 29 
P.3d 633. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to 
decide upon distribution of trust assets was 
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust ben-
eficiaries to determine distribution and offsets. 
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d 
233, aflTd, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
-Answers to interrogatories. 
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of 
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the 
pleadings and if l i e court considers them the 
other party must have the privilege of offering 
answering affidavits as upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. ^. 
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
Rights of opposing party. 
On review of a motion on the pleadings 
treated as a motion for summary judgment 
under Subdivision (c), the party against whom 
the judgment has been granted is entitled to 
have all the facts presented, and all the infer-
ences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a 
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co., 
8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958). 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
A motion for a more definite statement, and 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 186 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of th6 action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law, A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and i^ good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When^ a motion for summa^ judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend- ment" for "move with or without supporting 
ment substituted "move for summary judg- affidavits for a summary judgment m his favor" 
ADDENDUM B 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
In re the Marriage of: 
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and RICHARD 
L. KUNZ (deceased). 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 044902035 
JUDGE SANDRA N. PEULER 
On September 17, 2004, Commissioner Susan C. Bradford granted 
Lynee Kunz and Lillie Spencerfs Motions For Summary Judgment 
thereby dismissing petitioner Janice Kunz's "Verified Petition For 
Judicial Declaration Of A Common Law Marriage." Now, petitioner 
brings the matter before this Court on her objection to 
Commissioner Bradford's recommendation. Specifically, petitioner 
contends that issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. 
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Commissioner 
Bradford and declines to accept Mr. Morrison's Rule 56(f) 
affidavit. The Court finds, with respect to the legal matters at 
issue, further discovery is unnecessary. Furthermore, with respect 
to her pending motion, petitioner requests oral arguments. Such 
request is denied as oral arguments were heard before Commissioner 
Bradford, and this Court has fully considered the transcript of 
that hearing. 
Now, after consideration of the pending motion and relevant 
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KUNZ 
legal authorities, the Court affirms Commissioner Bradfordfs 
September 17, 2004, recommendation granting summary judgment. The 
Court reaches this conclusion based upon the fact that even if the 
decedent Richard Kunz and petitioner Janice Kunz had a common law 
marriage, their alleged "union" was never legally defined as such 
prior to his 1999 marriage to Lynne R Kunz. See, Utah Code Ann. 
30-1-4.5. Additionally, after 1999, Mr. Kunz, did not have the 
ability to consent to a common law marriage with Janice Kunz 
because he was legally married to Lynne R Kunz. 
For these reasons petitioner's objection is hereby denied and 
Commissioner Bradford1s recommendation is affirmed. 
This is the final Order of this Court and no further Order is 
necessary. 
Dated this 
Ho 
day of November, 2 004. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER, to the following, this {& Day of (\3f) (/ / 
2004 
Ronald Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Grant W Morrison 
William P Morrison 
Morrison & Morrison 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Grant W. P. Morrison (3666) 
William P. Morrison (7587) 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7999 
Facsimile: (801) 359-1774 
FUiflO!S?II@TCOI2I7 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 ^ 2095 
3ALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re the Marriage of: 
JANICE RIRIE KUNZ and RICHARD 
L. KUNZ (deceased). 
ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS' 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No.: 044902035 
Judge: PEULER 
Commissioner: BRADFORD 
This matter came on for a hearing before Commissioner 
Bradford on March 3, 2005, at 9:30 a.m., on Petitioner's Motion 
to Strike Respondents' Affidavit in Support of Attorney Fees. 
Petitioner was represented at the hearing by her attorneys, Grant 
W. P. Morrison and William P. Morrison. Respondents were 
represented at the hearing by their attorney, Ronald Barker. The 
Court having considered the pleadings on file and the arguments 
of counsel, and having been fully advised in the premises, now 
for good cause showing hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as 
follows: 
1. Respondents' request for attorney fees is denied as 
untimely. Respondents' request has not been presented to the 
Court in the form of a technical motion for attorney fees. 
Instead, the request was presented by way of an affidavit in 
support of attorney fees, and as part of respondents' initial 
motion for summary judgment- The motion for summary judgment was 
heard and adjudicated by Commissioner Bradford on September 17, 
2004, at which time the Commissioner made a recommendation that 
did not award attorney fees to either party. Respondents did not 
timely file an objection to the recommendation, which was 
subsequently affirmed by the Court on November 16, 2004, in an 
Order that was deemed a Mfinal Order". The proper vehicle for 
presenting respondents' request for attorney fees was in the form 
of an objection to the Commissioner's recommendation of September 
17, 2004. Because respondents did not timely file an objection 
to the recommendation, they are now time-barred from doing so. 
2. Section 30-3-3 of the Utah Code does not apply to this 
proceeding, because this is not an action to establish an order 
of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case. Instead, this is simply an action 
to seek the judicial declaration of a common law marriage. 
3. No attorney fees shall be awarded to either party. 
DATED this dtf day of /)/[ajL£M- / 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
SUSAN C. BRADFORD Date 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER 
Approved as to form: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This certifies that on the */-f*•» day of VV\^'LI> , 
2005, I caused to be mailed, first-class and postage-prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying 
Respondents' Request for Attorney Fees to the following: 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Respondents 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF, 
Case No. 044902035 
RICHARD L. KUNZ, 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
September 17, 2004'' ' 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SUSAN BRADFORD 
Third District Court Commissioner 
APPEARANCES 
-1-
For the Petitioner: WILLIAM P. MORRISON 
MORRISON & MORRISON 
352 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-7999 
For the Respondent: RON BARKER 
2870 South State St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Telephone: (801)486-9636 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Teiephone: (801) 377-0027 
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1 But from the time that he married the last person before he died, 
2 some four-and-a-half years, she couldn't have filed either 
3 I administratively or in the Court seeking to have that marriage or 
4 that relationship declared to be a valid common law marriage. 
5 I So having lost the ability to do so, and a time limit 
6 J being fixed by statute, the only sensible construction is that 
7 when the right to sue stopped the statute started. When she lost 
8 her right to sue to have her marriage declared valid as a common 
9 law marriage, the statute of limitations had to start then, 
10 That's got to be the latest. That's (inaudible). I think that's 
11 dispositive in the case. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. BARKER: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Morrison? 
I / 
15 MR. MORRISON: Thank you, your Honor. I'll stand ijf 
16 that's allowed. 
17 THE COURT: Certainly. Thank you, sir. 
18 MR. MORRISON: Just remain at this table. There's a 
19 fundamental flaw in the respondent's argument, and that is this: 
20 J they're claiming that she should have filed it more timely, 
21 immediately or within one year after Lynn Kunz purported to marry 
22 Richard, the decedent?. 
23 The flaw in that argument is in our affidavit we lay 
24 out — this is in Janice Kunz's affidavit that we've submitted to 
25 the Court, paragraph 9 of that affidavit, "It was only after my 
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1 husband passed away that I found out about his purported marriage 
2 to Lynn Kunz." This was so secretive that nobody knew about it. 
3 One, we've since found out that one of Mr. Kunz's 
4 children was advised of that marriage, but nobody else knew about 
5 it. 
6 THE COURT: So you're saying she had no idea? 
7 MR. MORRISON: How could she do this? That's exactly 
8 right. She can't do something that she has no information to go 
9 off of, no notice of. It's not as if they were moving in 
10 together, opening up joint bank accounts, filing joint tax 
11 returns. The whole thing was a sham from the very beginning. 
12 What they're attempting to do is perpetrate a fraud 
13 upon the State of Utah by going out and getting this marriage 
14 certificate and passing that off as a valid marriage. That's 
15 right in our affidavit. I don't — apparently they've missed 
16 that, but that is a key issue in this case. 
17 Our client cannot undertake an action that she doesn't 
18 know that she's supposed to undertake. That's the first point 
19 that I'd like to make. 
20 Just continuing on with those thoughts— 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you a question on that. 
22 Let's assume 'for a moment that Mr. Kunz is alive and that he has 
23 10 plural wives- and they all walk out the same day, and they all 
24 come into court and they file for a common law marriage. How 
25 many common law marriages can the Court find? 
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1 MR. MORRISON: There's only one valid marriage allowed 
2 in Utah. 
3 THE COURT: That's correct. So how do I find in this 
4 particular case we have a decedent, we have purportedly a 
5 marriage certificate, your client or Janice is divorced. That's 
6 I not argued. No one disputes that fact. They divorced. Everyone 
7 agrees they divorced. 
8 Now unless that's a fraud you can't have it both ways. 
3 You can't claim marriage is fraud and divorces are fraud and 
10 everything in this case is a fraud that's happened in 50 years. 
11 They married, they divorced, and then supposedly they have lived 
12 together all along, but there's another marriage in here, and she 
13 has just supposedly found out about that and doesn't think it's 
14 valid. She thinks it's a sham marriage. 
15 I So you're saying Lynn perpetrated for these three-a;nd-
16 a-half years this sham marriage and your client didn't do 
17 anything — didn't know about it, couldn't do anything. Didn't 
18 know about it until when? 
19 MR. MORRISON: Until after the funeral was held, 
20 after — this isn't in evidence before the Court. All I can say 
21 is based on the evidence that is before the Court— 
22 THE COURT: It: was after. I realize I'm asking you 
23 these questions, and again, I'll make the decision whether it's a 
24 12(b) or a motion 56, and I've asked Counsel also questions that 
25 may go beyond the parameters, but that's because I'm very curious 
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1 about the facts of this case, and maybe you can fill in details 
2 for me. 
3 MR. MORRISON: We would like to do that. We would like 
4 to reach the merits of the case at some point. Did the Court 
5 have other questions on that particular issue? 
6 THE COURT: No. Did — are you challenging that the 
7 marriage license is valid? 
8 MR. MORRISON: We're disputing the validity of Lynn's 
9 marriage to Richard. 
10 THE COURT: But is the marriage license invalid? 
11 MR. MORRISON: I think it's invalid to the extent that 
12 she's not capable of marrying somebody else. We assert in our 
13 pleadings that she was already married to another individual, 
14 Andrew Williams. 
15 THE COURT: I think there are divorce documents on 
16 Andrew; is that correct? Do you dispute the validity of the 
17 divorce documents on Andrew? 
18 MR. MORRISON: These type of arrangements are very 
19 unique, as the Court understands. 
20 THE COURT: They are unique. I see that Counsel — we 
21 at least have a sense of humor knowing that the factual scenario 
22 is unique. 
23 MR. MORRISON: There's an effort here to try to avoid 
24 running afoul of criminal law. 
25 THE COURT: That's right, because it's a bigamy issue, 
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1 and if they're skirting one issue and asking for the relief on 
2 the other, it's like we want to perpetrate a fraud over here, but 
3 we want our cake and eat itr too. I mean it does circle all 
4 around that. We all see that. 
5 MR. MORRISON: That's correct. These are the facts that 
6 are before the Court. We've introduced a document — the funeral 
7 I log that shows that Lynn Kunzr her name appears on that log. 
8 There's an entry there for Andrew, Lynn and another plural 
9 spouse, Teresa Williams. Not signed as Lynn Kunz, instead 
10 Andrew, Lynn and Teresa Williams. 
11 THE COURT: But you would — you're not making the 
12 argument that we can have three or four or five common law 
13 marriages. You're saying there can only be one, and I think that 
14 you've clearly stated that. 
15 MR. MORRISON: That's right, your Honor. That's 
16 correct. 
17 THE COURT: So your client also stated in an affidavit 
18 that he spent his time between Lillian and Janice. So who takes 
19 precedence as to the common law between them? 
20 MR. MORRISON: Our claim came first out of anybody, so 
21 we're first in line. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MS. MORRISON: I think that is important because we just 
24 have a new precedent from the Utah Supreme Court that just barely 
25 came dawn, State of Utah vs. Thomas Arthur Green just recently 
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1 handed down on September 3rd, 2004 where they did address the 
2 common law marriage aspect— 
3 MR. BARKER: Citation? 
4 I MR. MORRISON: You can get a copy of it just on the 
5 I fifth floor. Itfs too new to have a citation, but it is docket 
6 No. 20010788. 
7 MR. BARKER: What is the title of the case? 
8 MR. MORRISON: State of Utah vs. Thomas Arthur Green. 
9 THE COURT: What} is the holding- in /that case? 
10 MR. MORRISON: A number of holdings. He was declared 
11 guilty. His conviction on the charge of bigamy was affirmed. 
12 With respect to the common law marriage aspect, they allowed the 
13 State to file a petition to have him judicially declared married 
14 to one of these plural spouses, and the spouse that he was 
t I 
15 married to was the fir^t in line. He had some previous spouses 
16 that had divorced him, and those were actual legitimate divorces. 
17 They parted ways. That left this individual, Linda Kunz — that 
18 could be some distant relationship with these parties here. 
19 THE COURT: We may be in that case before we're done. 
20 MR. MORRISON: It would not surprise me. But 
21 effectively that's what the Court did is they allowed the Court 
22 to enter a civil finding of a common law marriage with respect to 
23 the first spouse in line. 
24 THE COURT: Tell me, in that factual case was there any 
25 wife afterwards that had a valid marriage license? 
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1 MR. MORRISON: Not that I'm aware of. 
2 THE COURT: So that we're comparing factually similar 
3 cases, because in this case one of the key factual issues is that 
4 marriage license to Lynn. 
5 MR. MORRISON: That's— 
6 THE COURT: I mean a critical factual issue, and I want 
7 to know if the Court overlooked a marriage solemnized, or at 
8 least in our particular case, a marriage license that was granted 
9 by the clerk of the court, that the officiating officer that 
10 signed it it's — they are criminal charges that go to the person 
11 doing this kind of ceremony if they're illegally marrying people. 
12 Likewise, the fraud that would be committed by that that goes to 
13 that. 
14 So in that particular case there was no standing 
15 marriage that needed to b e — 
16 MR. MORRISON: Not that I'm aware ,of. 
17 I THE COURT: —taken aside and declared a sham or 
18 whatever, like we're trying to do in this case. A different 
19 scenario. I just want to make sure that I'm not — that we don't 
20 have exactly the same factual scenario, and it seems that the 
21 difference is in this case you have this marriage with Richard to 
22 Lynn that occurred in
 v'19 99. 
23 MR. MORRISON: I just don't know if it's — 
24 THE COURT: They divorced — she divorced — in 1991 or 
25 1992,she divorced Andrew. 
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1 MR. MORRISON: On paper, at least. 
2 THE COURT: Well, arguably all these people could live 
3 in one big commune, but for the State's purposes, I can only have 
4 one person married at a time. I mean they could be living, you 
5 know, 800 people all in one big group, but I can only legally 
6 ascertain — and I'm grateful that both attorneys agree there can 
7 only be one marriage. Whether that's a common law marriage or a 
8 civilly declared marriage, there can only,be one between — or 
9 two .people at any given time as husband and wife. So that we do 
10 I agree on. 
11 MR. MORRISON: We do. 
12 THE COURT: Gratefully. 
13 MR. MORRISON: And I didn't mean to — I keep jumping in 
14 before the Court has finished. 
15 THE COURT: No, that's okay. I had a question on that, 
16 and it's appropriate to bring it up and make me aware of it. 
17 Thank you. 
18 MR. MORRISON: Just to respond to the Court's question 
19 on this Green case, I am not aware of an actual solemnized 
20 marriage that was overlooked in favor of the first marriage. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. MORRISON: I don ' t know i f i t ' s s p e l l e d out . I 
23 jus t— 
24 THE COURT: I don ' t know i f i t i s , e i t h e r . I cou ldn ' t 
25 address *that, Counsel. I don ' t know. 
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1 j MR. MORRISON: It's a fairly lengthy opinion, over 20 
2 pages long. 
3 I THE COURT: Okay. 
4 I MR. MORRISON: My father was involved in this case, just 
5 assisting the lead Counsel, John Bucher, since he had some 
6 problems with the bar. My father was asked to step in and heip 
7 j with oral argument, but I am not aware of all of the facts in 
8 that particular case. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
10 MR. MORRISON: Just a couple of more things to touch on. 
11 I appreciate the Court being fully aware of all of the pleadings 
12 and having read through everything. With respect to Lillie 
13 Spencer, we have an acknowledgment from her — and this is again 
14 an exhibit that we have introduced. This is a happy anniversary 
15 card. Just so it's right at the top of the Court's fingertips, 
16 I may I present another copy to the Court? 
17 THE COURT: Certainly. 
18 MR. BARKER: We don't dispute the date. (Inaudible) for 
19 j purpose of this motion. 
20 THE COURT: Couldn't it be possible that a lot of people 
21 in polygamy setting could have 30'h wedding anniversaries and 50r-h 
22 wedding anniversaries and 45r-h wedding anniversaries all 
23 coinciding at various times? 
24 MR. BARKER: Well, sure. 
25 THE COURT: In that realm where they have spiritual 
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that 
validity of Janice's 
is acknowledging 
now . It's been a 
it, jus 
little 
;t less 
over a 
year, but June 18th,. 2003. "God bless you on your golden 
anniversary, Richard and Janice. Happy anniversary with lots of 
love, Lillie." That just goes toward the holding out evidence 
that we need to introduce. 
MR. BARKER: We don't dispute that for purposes of this 
motion. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Morrison, anything further that— 
MR. MORRISON: What we're looking for is some kind of an 
indicia of an actual marriage between Lynn arid Richard. It's not 
in their affidavit. Instead we get a very scarce affidavit on 
file from Lynn Kunz. It doesn't say how she met Mr. Kunz. It 
doesn't say how long they courted before they decided to marry. 
It doesn't 'say that they cohabitated after their marriage. It 
doesn't say they had children together, had joint bank accounts, 
joint vehicles, joint real estate. 
THE COURT: But would they have done this marriage for 
purposes to skirt bigamy charges? 
MR. MORRISON: I think they did the marriage to skirt 
the immigration problem that Lynn was facing. 
THE COURT: Oh, so it does have a purpose. Isn't that 
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1 done every day in"the United States by many, many people? 
2 MR. MORRISON: I think it's investigated. If it is 
3 intentionally done strictly for that reason, I believe that can 
4 be set aside as an unlawful marriage. That's my understanding. 
5 I'm not an expert on that. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. So the purpose for this one was to 
7 skirt immigration laws for — was it Lynn? 
8 MR. MORRISON: For Lynn. She was here on a soon-to-be-
9 expired visa. Her husband — her actual husband, Andrew 
10 Williams, already had a solemnized marriage, apparently, to 
11 another individual, Teresa. That's the other name on the funeral 
12 log. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 MR. MORRISON: So he could not marry her and get hear 
15 to remain in the country. Mr. Kunz offered a helping hand. 
16 THE COURT: Well, but she was divorced from Andrew some 
17 time — I mean it looks like five years prior. It wasn't one of 
18 these thin'gs.that was hatched' overnight. Is that right? 
19 MR. MORRISON: That's what we've got as far as the 
20 evidence. 
21 THE COURT: I mean from what I'm looking at, they got a 
22 divorce in 1992 in England, and Lynn and Richard get married in 
23 1999. Was she in England at the time of their marriage? Is that 
24 what you're saying? Or she was here and her visa was about to 
25 run out? 
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1 MR. MORRISON: She .was in the United States and her visa 
2 was about to expire. 
3 THE COURT: He married her for that reason and do you 
4 I know any other reason? And Lynn is saying something to the 
5 contrary, I guess. 
6 MR. MORRISON: We'd like to do some discovery. If it's 
7 disputed how can we resolve it on summary judgment? 
8 THE COURT: Tell me, do you think that the documents — 
9 I guess it comes down to this. Do the documents on their face, 
10 do we take them as prima facia evidence of what they are, or do 
11 I we go behind them and say, "Well, if they perpetrated a fraud, 
12 why didn't she perpetrate a fraud? She did a divorce, didn't 
13 marry and allowed this to happen." At what point do we call the 
14 fraud on anyone that's perpetrated the fraud and allow them to 
15 I get the benefit of that? At what point is the fcraud called if 
16 what they're all doing is skirting all the laws so that they can 
17 perpetrate their religious beliefs and really call what it is as 
18 la fraud. 
19 MR. MORRISON: That's a good question. Somebody is 
20 entitled the be the spouse, and that's what we have to determine. 
21 THE COURT: So at what point does the Court say, "If 
22 I you're going to try and perpetrate a fraud then we're going to go 
23 by what you have — the documents that you have done. We will 
24 not let you continue to perpetrate frauds on the Court, and you 
25 will be held to the standard. If you enter a marriage, you're 
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held to that marriage. If you get a divorce you're held to that 
divorce." How do we know which fraud — where to stop and where 
to start? 
MR. MORRISON: I would respectfully submit that my 
client out of any of the parties is the least to blame and has 
not committed any fraud. Her divorce — we can recognize that. 
We're not trying to set aside that divorce. We're seeking to 
have her determined to be the common law spouse. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. That's fair. 
MR. MORRISON: Other questions from the Court? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. MORRISON: We'll g<s ahead and submit it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Barker? 
MR. BARKER: Very briefly if I may respond. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BARKER: Even if, as they claim, she didn't know 
about the third marriage— 
THE .COURT: Let's say she didn't know about the marriage 
to Lynn, and it was only at his death — she's reading a funeral 
log and is shocked to find this out. 
MR. BARKER: Let's assume that's true, and for purposes 
of the motion I guess we have to assume that. 
THE COURT: Let's assume that, because we must assume it 
in a light most favorable, 
MR. BARKER: Right, but the second marriage, she surely 
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knew about that 14-year marriage or whatever it was. 
THE COURT: The one with Rachel? 
MR. BARKER: Rachel, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BARKER: She can't contend that she's still married 
to himr or that she has a common law marriage— 
THE COURT: During their marriage, no. 
MR. BARKER: No. 
THE COURT: But technically she could try and get it 
declared from the time after Rachel to— 
MR. BARKER: She could have done, and of course, what we 
really come down to is is the Court going to inquire as to why 
people marry? If we start doing that we open the door that — 
we'd be in the mire. No marriage would be sa'fe. They want the 
i 
Court to inquire as to why Richard married Lynn. Well, he 
married her, and they stayed married four-and-a-half years. 
During that time if the plaintiff had decided that she 
wanted to have a valid marriage, she could have asked him to 
marry her, or, she could have asked that the Court declare that 
their relationship be a common law marriage. She didn't do it. 
She waived her rights. She just sat on her rights for 50 years. 
Another thing I think we need to consider is the 
statute. It's not a statute of limitations; it's a statute of 
repose. It says must. It's a statute of repose. It can't be 
tolled because you didn't know, which is what their affidavit is 
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1 trying to do. It's a statute of repose. They didn't file within 
2 the year. They're absolutely barred. 
3 As the Court said, these are official documents. 
4 They're undisputed. They haven't challenged any of them. All 
5 they're saying is that, "We think that because there's a funeral 
6 log signed by some unknown person," that may create inference 
7 that they were going by different names that somehow it's not a 
8 valid marriage because the name Williams was used and she had 
9 been divorced from him for five years. That's so highly 
10 speculative that it doesn't come to the muster required for a 
11 56(f) affidavit. 
12 THE COURT: Well, people get divorced and keep old names 
13 and remarry, too. 
14 MR. BARKER: Well, of course they do. The fact thajt if 
15 she signed this anniversary card, we don't know if she's talking 
16 about a legal marriage or a religious marriage. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Morrison, let me ask you a question. 
18 Is your client seeking a common law marriage back to when? What 
19 about Rachel's marriage and then a death? Is she trying to claim 
20 a marriage for that time period? 
21 MR. MORRISON: I haven't really thought that issue 
22 through just because— 
23 THE COURT: Because itrs really been touched on. It's 
24 saying wait a second, she married, they divorced, and then he 
25 I marries Rachel. We've got Rachel, and they're arguably married 
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1 to Rachel. Now if she's trying to go back 50 years, how does 
2 she eviscerate Rachel's marriage? How can you be common law 
3 married to Rachel? How does that one happen? How do we take out 
4 Rachel's marriage and her subsequent death, at least for the time 
5 I period of those 14 years. So it couldn't have occurred right 
6 there, unless you're arguing that that one wasn't valid either. 
7 I So arguably we could take it back to Rachel's death, 
8 assuming they all lived together as one big happy family for 50 
9 years. Let's assume that for just the sake of argument. 
10 The law can only recognize one, so we have the first 
11 nine years or so with Janice. Then we go to Rachel for about 14 
12 years. Then Lillie — and there's never really a marriage that 
13 you have — either of you have told me that is recognized or 
14 solemnized by the State of Utah. That was arguably either a 
I i 
15 I common law marriage with the two of them, or with your client, 
16 Rachel is out of the picture. But there's no one that's really 
17 married to Richard that has been established by the law within 
18 one year anywhere in that time period. Nothing gets established. 
19 Then somewhere around 1999 we get Lynn and Richard. 
20 Supposedly Janice doesn't know about it. It's a secret marriage. 
21 I guess we could find out Richard is married to lots of other 
22 people that we don't know about, too. That's conceivably 
23 possible, but for our purposes we do have this marriage 
24 certificate. 
25 Your client is claiming no, it was a fraud on her. Is 
rm 
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1 it a fraud on her? Didn't Lynn and Richard have the capacity to 
2 enter into any relationship they wanted to? How can she 
3 challenge if they want to enter into a marriage? Did they do 
4 that to take away property? Did they do that in some way to ha 
5 Janice? How were Janice's rights affected, and if they were 
6 affected, why wasn't Janice in court? I'm just trying to 
7 logically think this through, so if you will bear with me in time 
8 I how this would really pan out, what does this really mean? 
9 I see that you're both — you're sort of smiling and 
10 nodding because you see the horns of a dilemma too. I'm sure you 
11 see it. So it's — we're now to the point where Richard is 
12 deceased, and Janice either wants to go back to her divorce in 
13 1961 or her marriage in 1953 and say, "I have standing over all 
14 others, including Rachel and that marriage, including Lynn and 
15 I that marriage, and whatever common law marriage might have been 
16 the case with Lillian or if there's a question with Lillian now, 
17 the two of us can battle it out, and according to the Green case 
18 I I'm first in line. I'm the common law marriage." Do I basically 
19 have that right? 
20 MR. MORRISON: (Inaudible). 
21 I THE COURT: According to your client's argument, that's 
22 what she's seeking, and according to Mr. Barker's client's 
23 I argument, a marriage is a marriage, a divorce is a divorce, and 
24 you can only have one marriage going at one time between one man 
25 I and one woman according to Utah law. Anything else is bigamy. 
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1 I So we have documents that show the marriage and the 
2 divorce with Janice. There was an intervening time period where 
3 Janice, if she was there, could have gotten a common law marriage 
4 truly, but he married Rachel. I don't think anybody is claiming 
5 I he didn't marry Rachel. No one has told me they weren't married, 
6 and then they divorced — or actually she died, and that lasts 
7 for about 14 years. 
8 I Then we have the relationship with Lillian, which was 
9 never solemnized in any kind of legal sense, and then we have the 
10 marriage in 1999 to Lynn. Janice wants those all taken out, and 
11 Mr. Barker is saying can't do. We have a legal document that 
12 says they were married. For that purpose she can't now undo that 
13 one, and she has passed the time period for a common law marriage 
14 I because they were married, and you're saying can't do because she 
15 didn't know about it. 
16 Okay. Have I missed anything? I mean'basically 
17 factually. If I have, just let me know. I just want to make 
18 sure I -- I think I have your arguments, I think — I hope 
19 I correct. 
20 MR. BARKER: The one thing you didn't mention is our 
21 argument is that the last marriage has the strong presumption, 
22 and I've got a whole series of research on it, if the Court would 
23 like. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. BARKER: I haven't read the Green case. I don't 
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know if that (inaudible) or not 
THE COURT: Certainly for purposes of common law, 
they're saying the first one if there's a string of people, if 
there is no valid marriage in the Green case. 
MR. BARKER: We really appreciate the time you've 
devoted to this. It's obviously you're worked hard on it. It's 
difficult. 
THE COURT: Quite frankly, I can tell you one place I'm 
not going. I'm not going to do a 12(b) (6). I think if anything 
it moves to the — a summary judgment area. On the petition 
alone it's generally discouraged to do 12(b) (6) motions, and I 
think both attorneys know that. The law is quite clear on that. 
That's really a hard one to leap to. So I'm not inclined to do a 
12(b) (6) motion. I would be looking at this more as a 56(f)' 
motion, a summary judgment, to be quite honest. 
The question for me is do I have any genuine issue as to 
a material fact. If I do then it's appropriate to do discovery 
because if there's even one issue that is disputed that could 
potentially be disputed that requires that scrutiny, then it must 
be given in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, which 
would be Mr. Morrison and his client. 
What I'm going to do is take a five-minute break and go 
sort out in my mind what you have told me,,*because I think that's 
appropriate, but you know I'm not going to do a 12(b)(6). I'm 
not going to go there. It's a question of the summary judgment 
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and whether there is any genuine issue of fact that is in 
dispute. That is the only issue, and I think it comes down to 
that. That's where we're at, and both attorneys are nodding. I 
think you know that, too. 
MR. BARKER: Very good. 
THE COURT: So with that, give me five minutes while — 
because I want to sort out in my mind what you have told me here 
and sort of digest it, and T t-.hinlr ynn wnnlri appreciate more a 
decision right now today because no matter what I do you will 
object to it — some side will object to it, and you will get it 
with Judge Peuler shortly that way, which it deserves, and I 
respect that you would do that. 
It is appropriate that you zealously represent your 
client no matter who does that objection. If j knew in my mind 
i 
right now I'd tell your but I want to go and think it through and 
i 
deal with it, and then I'll be right back «*<-» t-.iiat- T direst- i t-
clearly for me. Thank you. 
(Nothing further on disc) 
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MR. BARKER: Very good. 
THE COURT: So with that, give me five minutes while — 
because I want to sort out in my mind what you have told me here 
and sort of digest it, and I think you would appreciate more a 
decision right now today because no matter what I do you will 
object to it — some side will object to it, and you will get it 
with Judge Peuler shortly that way, which it deserves, and I 
respect that you would do that. 
It is appropriate that you zealously represent your 
client no matter who does that objection. If I knew in my mind 
right now I'd tell you, but I want to go and think it through and 
deal with it, and then I'll be right back so that I digest it 
clearly for me. Thank you. 
(Short recess taken) 
THE COURT: (Court already in session when recorder was 
turned on) a couple more questions because I — there were a' few 
facts that I wanted to get clear. Janice didn't know about the 
marriage to Lynn, supposedly, until the log — the funeral log, 
if I recall. They never knew each other? They never knew each 
other — never met? 
MR. MORRISON: I can't say for certainty whether that's 
true, but I don't— 
THE COURT: She has resided with Richard every day, 
every moment? 
MR. MORRISON: When you say "she" you mean— 
THE COURT: Janice. 
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MR. MORRISON: —Janice. 
THE COURT: Every day, every moment since really their 
marriage? 
MR. MORRISON: Not totally correct because he's also 
split part of his time with Lillie Spencer, so I don't want to 
mislead the Court on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. So Lillie Spencer signed the marriage 
certificate with Lynn, and so how would he not — how would she 
not know? Did these — they never talk, Lillie and Janice never 
talk, and they wouldn't have mentioned this little certificate 
that has Lillie's name on it where he's spending half of his 
time? 
MR. MORRISON: That's a good question. We're in 
litigation right now with Lillie Spencer as far as — there's a 
trust agreement that we're looking at, but I can't really answer, 
that question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MORRISON: Other than what we've got presented as 
far as the evidence before the Court up to this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Morrison, I'm going to tell you 
what — or ask you, tell me what disputed facts there are that 
needs more discovery. Tell me what is really disputed. Do you 
want to go behind the marriage of Lynn and Richard and find out 
why, why they married? 
MR. MORRISON: We'd like to do some discovery in these 
areas. We want to find out— 
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THE COURT: If it's determined to be a valid marriage 
where does that put your client? 
MR. MORRISON: If their marriage is valid then I think 
we're done. 
THE COURT: I think so, too. 
MR. MORRISON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So what do you need to know to know if 
that's a valid marriage? You've got a certified copy of a 
marriage license. On its face that's a prima facia case that 
it's valid, arguably, prima facia case. To prove some kind of 
fraud you have a clear and convincing standard. Tell me what you 
need to know that you don't know. 
MR. MORRISON: I think we have a pretty good idea of 
where we stand on the case, and I think we have a pretty goofcl 
idea of the facts. We would like an opportunity to look into a 
couple of areas to flesh out the arguments that we've presented. 
We want to have — there's a lot of questions that the Court has 
asked me that I can only speculate on today. I would like to be 
able to pin those down so I'm not just guessing. 
THE COURT: Arguably the time period — Janice knew of 
the marriage to Rachel? 
MR. MORRISON: Yes, she did. 
THE COURT: She couldn't possibly be claiming a common 
law marriage either prior to Janice — Rachel's death. Couldn't 
possibly. 
MR. MORRISON: I think we can go from at least back to 
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1 I the date of her death. I think we're on safe ground there. 
2 THE COURT: That would be — in any possible realm she 
3 J couldn't possibly be claiming before that time. 
4 MR. MORRISON: Only with respect to an interpretation of 
5 J the Green case that says you go back to the first case — the 
6 J first marriage. 
7 THE COURT: Then you have to knock out a valid marriage. 
8 MR. MORRISON: If it was valid to begin with. If he's 
9 I already married to somebody else then how can that be valid? 
10 THE COURT: But he's divorced. He was divorced from 
11 I your client, and that is acknowledged as an undisputed fact. 
12 MR. MORRISON: That's correct. He divorced her and 
13 continued to be married to her. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. So in essence, it feels like I'm 
15 I either tacitly approving polygamist relationships by allowing 
16 I these common laws marriages, divorces, marriages, divorces to 
17 I accumulate so that we don't have to count any of the marriages, 
18 we just go back to the first one. We allow that perpetration of 
19 la fraud on the courts and society in favor of the first 
20 I polygamist wife, disregarding alL of the fraud that had been 
21 I committed since that time, and the tacit approval of the first 
22 wife, correct? 
23 J MR. MORRISON: Did the Court want me to respond to that, 
24 o r — 
25 THE COURT: If you would like. 
26 I MR. MORRISON: I can see no reason to give any 
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protection whatsoever to the marriage relationship between Lynn 
Kunz and Richard Kunz. It wasn't a valid marriage. They weren't 
living together as husband and wife, and for all of those reasons 
we've presented prior in our initial presentation. 
THE COURT: But your client was cohabitating with 
Richard and Lillie up to the death. 
MR. MORRISON: Well, there were separate residences. I 
want to keep that straight, but— 
THE COURT: But there was mutual cohabitations going on. 
MR. MORRISON: Correct, pursuant to their— 
THE COURT: But their cohabitation takes precedent over 
the marriage? 
MR. MORRISON: Over Lynn's marriage, which was a sham 
that we've asserted. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything further you would 
like to say, Mr. Barker? 
MR. BARKER: I agree with the Court. We've got to go by 
the records, by the documents. We can't go behind a marriage 
and inquire why did the people decide to marry, or why did they 
decide not to marry. If we start doing that no marriage would 
have a solid foundation. As a matter of public policy we've got 
to rely on these documents unless someone comes in with clear and 
convincing proof to show deprivement, and the person has to have 
clean hands that does that, and they don't. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I'm prepared to make 
a recommendation in this matter. This is a motion for summary 
judgment or to dis 
least. I have not had a case of this factual scenario ever 
before, and it is — I don't know that it may be new to the 
entire system. I can — quite certain that might be the case 
here in Utah. 
6 So for our purposes here in the motion for summary 
7 I judgment or to dismiss, and the question I've already told you 
8 I'm not going to do the alternative 12(b)6 motion. I'm entering 
9 this as a motion for summary judgment, or rather I'm reviewing it 
10 I as a motion for summary judgment. 
11 I Looking at all of the facts, the petitioner was married 
12 and then subsequently divorced from the decedent, Mr. Kunz, and 
13 I she wants that declared now to be a common law marriage, which on 
14 its face I have to invalidate the certified copy of the marriage 
15 between Lynn and Richard in 1999. To do that there has to be 
16 clear and convincing evidence that that was frapd. I don't 
17 I have — that is a higher level. It is just under a criminal 
18 standard. I don't have that level. It doesn't rise to that 
19 level. 
20 I can't see that I shouldn't grant the summary judgment 
21 I because on its face and the documents presented, the evidence 
22 presented is there is a valid marriage. There has been a valid 
23 marriage since 1999 in this case, and I don't have anything that 
24 stands in the way to show that it is not a valid marriage other 
25 J than conclusary statements, which is not the test under a 56(f) 
2 6 | matter, and so the motion for summary judgment is granted. 
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You have 10 days to file an objection with Judge Peuler. 
I appreciate your thoughtful arguments, your time. They are both 
well taken. You have ably represented your clients on both 
sides. 
MR. BARKER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BARKER: We commend the Court for its careful 
consideration. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MORRISON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Morrison. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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Chapter 1: < Prev Next> 
C. Using a Fake Marriage to Come to the U.S. 
It is illegal for anyone to get married solely for the purpose of getting, or helping someone to get, 
permanent residence in the United States. There are stiff fines and possible jail terms for people who 
are convicted of this crime. But we would be foolish not to address the fact that many people 
attempt to fake a marriage to obtain a green card. 
md If you are getting married for legitimate reasons, you can skip this section and continue 
reading at Section D. 
If you are considering a fake, or sham, marriage, you probably already know that what you are 
planning is illegal. You should also know that this book is written with the assumption that you are 
marrying for love, not for a green card. We are not going to give you any special tips on making a 
fraudulent marriage look real. However, we will outline the risks for you. 
1. What Is a Sham Marriage? 
A sham marriage is one that is entered into in order to get around the U.S. immigration laws. For a 
marriage to be valid under the law, it is not enough that the couple had a real marriage ceremony and 
got all the right governmental stamps on their marriage certificate. They have to intend to live in a 
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real marital relationship following the marriage ceremony — and prove their intention through their 
actions. If the couple doesn't intend to establish a life together, their marriage is a sham. (For more 
on what USCIS considers to be a real or bona fide marital relationship for purposes of green card 
eligibility, see Chapter 2, Section B.) 
2. Will You Get Caught? 
Detecting marriage frauds is a top priority for USCIS. USCIS officers still quote a survey from the 
1980s which found that up to 30% of marriages between aliens and U.S. citizens are suspect. That 
survey has since been shown to be deeply flawed, but its legacy lives on. 
In order to detect frauds, the immigration authorities require a lot of proof that a marriage is real, 
including more documentation than for other family-based immigration applicants. They subject 
marriage-based immigrants to a longer and more detailed personal interview and a two-year testing 
period for couples who have been married fewer than two years. 
The government will not normally follow you around or investigate your life beyond the required 
paperwork and the interviews it always conducts. But it has the power to look deeply into your life if 
the authorities get suspicious. Government inspectors can visit your home, talk to your friends, 
interview your employers, and more. By requiring more of married couples than others, the 
government has already set up a system that gives it a lot of information about whether your 
marriage is real. 
What is the U.S. governments view of a normal marriage? The statutes and regulations don't go into 
detail on this, so the following comes from a combination of court cases and attorneys' experiences. 
According to USCIS, the normal couple has a fair amount in common. They share a language and 
religion. They live together and do things together, like take vacations, celebrate important events or 
holidays, and have sex and children. Normal couples also combine financial and other aspects of 
their lives after marriage. They demonstrate their trust in one another by sharing bank and credit card 
accounts and ownership of property, such as cars and houses. 
The government requires applicants to prove that they share their lives in a way similar to what is 
described above. Applicants do this by providing copies of documents like rental agreements, bank 
account statements, and children's birth certificates. The government further tests the validity of the 
marriage by talking to the applicant and usually to his or her spouse. Every marriage-based applicant 
for a visa or green card (including fiances), whether they are applying in the United States or 
overseas, will have to attend a personal interview with a U.S. government official. 
U.S. government officials have developed amazing talents for discovering fraud by examining what 
look like insignificant details of people's lives. To ferret out lies, they have learned to cross-check 
dates and facts within the application forms and between the application forms and people's 
testimony. 
EXAMPLE: Rasputin has married Alice, a U.S. citizen, in the hopes of obtaining a 
green card. They submit an application for a green card in the United States. At 
Rasputin's green card interview, the officer asks for his lull name, his address, and how 
he entered the United States. Rasputin can't believe how easy this all is. The officer goes 
on to ask for the dates of all of Rasputin's visits to the United States, the date of his 
divorce from his previous wife and the dates of all of his children's births. Rasputin is 
getting bored. Then the officer notices something funny. The date of birth of Rasputin's 
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last child by his former wife is a full year after the date of their supposed divorce. The 
officer becomes suspicious, and Rasputin and Alice are taken to separate rooms for 
fraud interviews. They are examined in minute detail about their married lives. When 
neither of them can remember what the other one eats for breakfast or what they did for 
their last birthdays, the case is denied and referred to the local Immigration Court for 
proceedings to deport Rasputin. 
If a couple has been married for less than two years when the immigrant first receives residency, 
USCIS gets a second chance at testing the validity of the marriage. The immigrants in such couples 
don't get a permanent green card right away. Instead, the law requires that their first green card 
expire after another two years. (The technical term is that the immigrant has "conditional residency.") 
When the two years are up, both members of the couple must file an application for the immigrant's 
permanent residency. They must include copies of documents showing that they are still married and 
sharing the important elements of their lives. This form is mailed to a USCIS office. As USCIS 
knows, it is extremely difficult for members of sham marriages to keep things together for a full two 
years, even on paper. If the marriage appears to be a real one when the two years is up, the 
conversion from conditional to permanent residency won't involve an intensive investigation — the 
application process doesn't even include an interview if the written application looks legit. 
EXAMPLE: Maria married Fred, a U.S. citizen, in order to get a green card. Fred was 
a friend of Maria's, who simply wanted to help her out. Maria manages to get approved 
by the consulate at her immigrant visa interview, and enters the United States. Because 
their marriage is new, Maria is given two years as a conditional resident During those 
two years, Maria overdraws their joint checking account three times. Fred gets angry 
and closes the account. Maria has an accident with their jointly owned car and it goes to 
the junk yard. Fred buys another car in his own name and won't let Maria drive it Fred 
gets fed up and wonders why he got into this in the first place. He falls in love with 
someone else and insists that Maria move out. At the end of her two years of conditional 
residency, Maria can't get Fred to answer her phone calls. In desperation, she fills out 
the application form on her own, fakes Fred's signature and lists his address as her own. 
However, the only documents she can attach are the same bank account statements and 
car registration she submitted to the consulate two years ago. USCIS checks the files 
and notices this. They call her and Fred in for an interview. It's not long before the truth 
comes out and enforcement proceedings are begun. 
As you see from the examples above, people who enter into sham marriages most often trip 
themselves up just trying to get through the standard process. It's not that USCIS can read people's 
minds or that it spends all its time peeking into applicants' bedrooms. They simply catch a lot of 
people who thought that a fake marriage was going to be easier than it really is. 
References to the Immigration Laws in This Book 
Throughout this book are references to the federal immigration laws that govern 
immigration through marriage and to the regulations that describe how USCIS will 
apply those laws to you. (They look like this: "I.N.A. § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 
1430(a)," or "8 C.F.R. § 316.5.") We include these references where we feel it is 
important to indicate our sources for information and to help you research the 
immigration laws on your own. See Chapter 17 for more detail on what these 
references mean and how you can look them up. 
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3. What Happens If You Are Caught 
The law pretty much speaks for itself on what happens to immigrants who commit marriage fraud. 
You can face prison, a fine or both: 
Any individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the purpose of evading any 
provision of the immigration laws shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or 
fined not more than $250,000, or both (I.N.A. § 275(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)). 
The U.S. citizen or resident could also face criminal prosecution, including fines or imprisonment, 
depending on the facts of the case. They are most likely to be prosecuted for either criminal 
conspiracy (conspiring with the immigrant is enough; see U.S. v. Vickerage, 921 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 
1990)), or for establishing a "commercial enterprise" to get people green cards (see IN. A. § 275(d), 
8 U.S.C § 1325(d)). 
The extent to which these penalties are applied depends on the specifics of each case. The 
government tends to reserve the highest penalties for U.S. citizens or residents engaged in major 
conspiracy operations, such as systematically arranging fraudulent marriages. But that doesn't mean 
that small-time participants in marriage fraud can count on a soft punishment — though most 
immigrants will probably simply be deported and never allowed to return. 
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